Selten,R.(Ed):Game Equilibr.Models (closed)

Game Equilibrium Models I

Evolution and Game Dynamics

Editors: Selten, Reinhard (Ed.)

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About this book

There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games.

Table of contents (10 chapters)

Table of contents (10 chapters)
  • Introduction to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models”

    Pages 1-2

    Selten, Reinhard

  • Introduction to Volume I: Evolution and Game Dynamics

    Pages 3-5

    Selten, Reinhard

  • Game Theory and Population Dynamics in Complex Genetical Systems: The Role of Sex in Short Term and in Long Term Evolution

    Pages 6-28

    Eshel, Ilan

  • Evolutionary Stability and Dynamic Stability in a Class of Evolutionary Normal Form Games

    Pages 29-97

    Weissing, Franz J.

  • Anticipatory Learning in Two-Person Games

    Pages 98-154

    Selten, Reinhard

Buy this book

eBook $89.00
price for USA (gross)
  • ISBN 978-3-662-02674-8
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format: PDF
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
  • Immediate eBook download after purchase
Hardcover $119.99
price for USA
  • ISBN 978-3-540-54225-4
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.
Softcover $119.99
price for USA
  • ISBN 978-3-642-08108-8
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.

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Bibliographic Information

Bibliographic Information
Book Title
Game Equilibrium Models I
Book Subtitle
Evolution and Game Dynamics
Editors
  • Reinhard Selten
Copyright
1991
Publisher
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Copyright Holder
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
eBook ISBN
978-3-662-02674-8
DOI
10.1007/978-3-662-02674-8
Hardcover ISBN
978-3-540-54225-4
Softcover ISBN
978-3-642-08108-8
Edition Number
1
Number of Pages
IX, 330
Topics